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ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS ON THE FREEDOM
OF THE MATHEMATICIAN

I

T IS NOT unusual to find contemporary mathematicians
who claim to have an unlimited degree of freedom in their
discipline. Some even maintain that they can study (at
least symbolically) anything and everything. The mathematician, they say, simply posits any definitions he pleases concerning any group of symbols and relations among them, defines
the operations thereupon, and then proceeds logically. Needless to say, these mathematicians do not consider themselves
bound in any way to treat entities which resemble real physical
things. (Indeed, they not infrequently give the impression that
they have little or no concern as to whether their mathematical
considerations have any application to physical reality.) Nor
do they consider mathematics to be a science of abstracted
quantity in the traditional sense, fearing that to assert this
would needlessly restrict the range of their science.
The purpose of this essay is not to pass judgment on the
claims of today's mathematicians regarding freedom in their
science. I intend rather to investigate the philosophies of mathematics of two much earlier men, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas,
both of whom considered mathematics to be a science of quantity, in order to determine the degree of freedom each allowed
t;he mathematician in his science. Specifically, I will show that
the medieval theologian's doctrines contain significant advances
in this area over those of his Greek predecessor. Moreover, it
will be suggested that to designate mathematics as a science
of quantity, as these two thinkers do, still allows for a tremendous degree of freedom on the part of the mathematicianthough it is not claimed that either man envisioned, or would
agree with, the degree of freedom claimed by some mathematicians today.
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I.

THE QUESTION

Let us begin by returning to a point just mentioned, that for
both Aristotle and Aquinas mathematics is considered to be a
science of quantity. Let us hasten to add, however, that the
quantity studied in mathematics is, according to both thinkers,
a quantity not found as such in real things but a quantity
abstracted from such things. As is well known, this abstraction
involves mentally setting aside all the nonquantitative atributes of things and retaining only their quantitative ones.
In his famous text of the Metaphysics, a text which Thomas
repeats with approval in his Commentary, the Stagirite speaks
of the mathematician " stripping away" all features of things
but their quantitative attributes,
... the mathematician investigates abstractions (for before beginning his investigation he strips off all the sensible qualities, e. g.,
weight and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and
cold and other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantitative and continuous, sometimes in one, sometimes in two, sometimes in three dimensions, and the attributes of these qua quantitative and continuous, and does not consider them in any other
respect, ...1

Of course, it is precisely because of this mental abstraction, or
subtraction, that the quantities studied in mathematics are said
by both men to acquire their specific features as immobile,
nonsensible, free from time and place and from sensible matter,
and often possess less than three dimensions.
And yet, though the features of abstract mathematical quantities and quantified things are radically different, this does
not mean that these quantities are totally dissimilar; indeed,
both philosophers stress that it is in fact the quantities of
physical things that the mathematician studies. However, they
add-it is not as quantities of physical things that they are
studied. One text of Aristotle's which makes this clear is the
following:
1 Metaphysics, XI, 8, 1061a 29-86. Thomas's commentary is In XI Metapkllaica.
L. S, 220i.
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Obviously physical bodies contain surfaces and volumes, lines and
points, and these are the subject-matter of mathematics .... Now
the mathematician, though he too treats of these things, nevertheless does not treat of them as the limits of a physical body, nor does
he consider the attributes indicated as the attributes of such bodies.
That is why he separates them; for in thought they are separable ....2

Thomas Aquinas makes exactly the same point in his commentary on this passage. He affirms that the mathematician
and the natural philosopher both treat the same things, but
not in the same way.
The mathematician and the natural philosopher treat the same
things, i. e., points, and lines, and surfaces, and things of this sort,
but not ill the same way. For the mathematician does not treat
these things insofar as each of them is a boundary of a natural
body, nor does he consider those things which belong to them insofar as they are the boundaries of a natural body. But this is the
way in which natural science treats them .... Because the mathematician does not consider lines and points, and surfaces, and things
of this sort, quantities and their accidents, insofar as they are the
boundaries of a natural body, he is said to abstract from sensible
and natural matter.S

Clearly then for both men the mathematician does treat real
quantities but not as real.
And this brings us to the heart of the question of this study.
If mathematical quantities are nothing more than abstracted
real quantities; if they are gained simply by " stripping away"
all nonquantitative attributes of things, does this mean that for
Aquinas and Aristotle the mathematician is limited in his
science to treating objects which in their quantitative features
resemble the quantitative attributes of physical things? It is
true that both men give as examples of geometrical objects
rather elementary figures, circles, triangles, angles, etc., which
could easily be gained by abstraction from similarly figured
sensible things! But does this mean that they believe that
• Physics, IT, 2, 198b 28-24; 82-84.
• In II PhyBica, L. 8, 160-61.
'Heath points out both in A History of Greek Mathematics (Oxford: Clarendon
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mathematics is limited to just such quantities, quantities which
bear almost a one-to-one relation to real quantities? If this is
the case, then clearly the freedom of the mathematician is
severely restricted.
In order to answer this crucial question we will turn to a
more detailed consideration of what psychologically is actually
involved in mathematical abstraction according to both men.
This will aid us in determining just how free each considers
the mathematician to be in his act of abstraction. First,
Aristotle.
II.

THE FREEDOM OF THE MATHEMATICIAN ACCORDING TO

ARISTOTLE

In the famous text of his Posterior Analytics where he describes the general procedure of obtaining the universal from
sense experience Aristotle refers to the presence of what he
there calls" memory." Animals which have memory, he says,
are able to retain sense impressions and so provide for themselves some stability in the changeable data of sense experience.
Actually what Aristotle there calls memory he will later more
precisely designate imagination.6 Thus the role of imagination
in all abstraction (using this term now in a wider application
meaning the mental act of obtaining the universal from the
sensible particular) is evident. This would mean, of course,
that imagination is present in mathematical abstraction, too,
for it also begins with perception of changing sensible particulars. However, and this is a point which should be emphasized,
Aristotle never refers to imagination as having a particular or
special part in mathematics or mathematical abstraction. 1
t)

Press, 1960), I, 841 and Mathematics in Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949),
p. I, that Aristotle refers only to the most elementary geometrical figures. As for
Aquinas, I can only state that in my reading of him I have found nothing that
would invalidate this same conclusion.
S Poaterior Analytica, II, 19, 99b S6-100b 1.
• De Anima, III, 8.
" Some authors, particularly those inclined to read Aristotle through the eyes of
St. Thomas, ignore this fact. See for example, Mere St. Edouard, "La division
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It may be that he simply did not develop this point, or, of
course, it may be that he did not think imagination had any
special role in mathematical abstraction. An elaboration of
this second possibility is in order. According to the Stagirite,
imagination" has the objects of sense for its object." 8 Imagination is said to be the act of a sense faculty (though just what
sense faculty is not clear) 9 and is clearly distinguished from
the acts of the mind, affinnation and negation, and the knowledge of incomposites.10 But the objects of mathematics according to the Stagirite are not sensible for, as we noted, the mathematician leaves out the proper sensibles. Though his abstraction is based upon perception of the common sensibles, it is not
these qua sensible which he studies. Since mathematical quantities are not sensible, it would apparently follow that they are
not imaginable either, for, as was said, imagination is the act
of a sense power, it has" the objects of sense for its objects."
Mathematicals, then, would be knowable only by the mind.
We might note in support of this last statement that Aristotle
calls the matter of mathematicals " intelligible "; he never refers
to it as "imaginable." 11
And yet, from another point of view it would seem that this
very notion of intelligible matter indicates that mathematical
aristoh~1icienne

des sciences, selon Ie professeur A. Mansion," Laval Theologique
et Philo8ophique, XV (1959), 228 and M-V. Leroy, "Le savoir speculatif," Revue
Thomiste, XLVIII (1948), 808 if. Frere Augustin-Gabriel, "Matiere intelligible
et mathematique," Laval Theologique et Philo8ophique, XVII (1961), 187, admits
Aristotle does not have the doctrine and says one must "read between the lines "
to find it.
S De Anima, III, 8, 428b 18.
t In his On Memory and Reminiscence, Aristotle states that imagination is an
"affection of the sensus communis." (1, 450a 12) In the De Somnis, on the other
hand, he distinguishes between that power which is the controlling or judging
sense faculty (apparently the 8ensus c01nmunis) and that which presents images
(2, 460b 16-18; see also 8, 461 18-81). Furthermore, he explicitly identifies the
imaginative faculty with the sensitive faculty qua imaginative, though he does not
say what this sensitive faculty is. (1, 459a 15-16)
10 De Anima, III, 8, 482a 9-14.
11 For a discussion of Aristotle's notion of intelligible matter, consult my article
"Intelligible Matter and the Objects of Mathematics in Aristotle," The New
Scholaaticiam, XLIII (1969), 1-28.
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quantities must be imaginable, for intelligible matter for Aris . .
totle is viewed by him precisely as the principle of individuation
of mathematical forms. 12 Since individuals are attained directly
only by sense and not by mind which is directly of the universal,13 individual mathematicals could be grasped directly
only by a sense faculty. But since the quantities studied in
mathematics are not possessed of any proper sensible features,
they cannot be grasped by the exterior senses. Would it, then,
be imagination which grasps them? To be sure, Aristotle does
speak in the Metaphysics of individual mathematicals as known
by " intuition."
But when we come to the composite thing, e. g., this circle, i. e.,
one of the singular circles, whether sensible or intelligible (1 mean
by intelligible circles the ma.thematical, and by sensible circles those
of bronze, or of wood) -of these there is no definition, but they
are known with the aid of intuition or of sensation; and when they
pass out of this actual cognition it is not clear whether they are or
not; but they are always expressed and known by the universal
formula.14

But is this intuition imagination? Some have so interpreted
it; 15 Aristotle himself does not say. This much is clear from his
text; it is not an act of direct sensation, nor is it an act of mind,
that which grasps the definition, the universal formula. In the
absence of statements to the contrary, it is logical to presume
that it is imagination which is meant.16 Though exactly how
such entities could be imaginable, in view of the fact that they
lack sensible qualities, is still a question.
But if Aristotle never mentions it, why this stress on my
part on imagination? The reason is, and admittedly we are
Metaphysics, VII, 11, 1086b 85-1087a 4.
De Anima, ITI, 4, distinguishes sense knowledge from intellectual. See explicitly
4i9b 10-88. Also see Metaphysics, Vll, 10, 1086a I-Ii and Posterior Analytics,
11

18

I, 81, 87b 86-40; IT, 19, 100a 15-100b 1.
Metaphysics, Vll, 10, 1086a 1-8.
St. Thomas Aquinas interprets this intuition as imagination in In VII Metaphysics, L. 9, 1494-95.
18 Diego Pro, "Filosofia de la matematica en Arist6teles," Sapientia, XI (1956),
99, discusses Aristotle's obscurity on this point.
16

15
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looking ahead to Thomas Aquinas, if individual mathematical
objects have their locus in imagination, it would follow that
there is a certain degree of freedom on the part of the mathematician in regard to his objects. The Stagirite himself refers
in various places to the freedom men have in imagining.lT If
the locus of individual mathematicals were the imagination it
would seem to follow that the mathematician would be free to
deal with objects which do not closely correspond to anything
found in the physical world. There would be no reason to limit
him to simply studying abstracted quantities which resemble
the quantities of things, but he could treat quantities which he
himself had devised in imagination which have no one-to-one
correspondence to any physical quantities. Indeed, an epistemological basis could be provided for the tremendous development in modern times of nonrepresentational mathematical
systems such as the nonEuclidean geometries.
Now it is true, as we mentioned earlier, that the Stagirite
always cites as examples of geometrical objects figures which
could easily be gained by abstraction from similarly figured
sensible things. But our question is, does Aristotle in his philosophy of mathematics hold that the mathematician must
limit himself to such easily abstractable entities? In attempting
to answer this question it might be helpful to realize that it is
only the most general and basic elements of the genus quantity,
e. g., lines, planes, etc., that he explicitly mentions as obtained
by abstraction. ls Apparently all other mathematical objects
are to be constructed out of these basic abstracted entities.
No science, Aristotle says, demonstrates the very existence of
the subject with which it deals. 19 The mathematician, then,
apparently at first posits the existence of these most basic ele1'1'

De Anima,

m,

8, 427b 18-20; 11, 484a 9.

Thomas Greenwood, "Aristotle on Mathematical Constructibility," Thomiat,
XVII (1954), 89 and 98. The fact that these elements are so general and hence
so easily abstracted may well be the reason why Aristotle says that little experience
is needed in order to become a mathematician (Nicomachean EthiC8, VI, 8,
18

114ia 16-19).
18

Poaterior Analytica, I, 10, 76b 8-28.

288

THOMAS C.. ANDERSON

ments of the genus quantity gained by abstraction 20 and then
through construction using these elements goes on to " demonstrate the existence " and investigate the properties of all the
other objects he dedls with. (Aristotle does say that before
the properties of a mathematical object can be investigated it
must be demonstrated that that object exists. 21 The actual
practice used at his time to " demonstrate" the existence of a
particular mathematical quantity was to construct it.) 22 Our
question is then is the mathematician free to use these basic
elements to construct (and hence demonstrate the existence
of) any figure he desires-any figure that is, whose very existence is not self-contradictory (like square circles)? Certainly
the most basic abstracted elements, those whose existence is
simply posited, are so general as to be able to form any figure
or number. And yet the Stagirite never states that the mathematician has the freedom to construct these elements into any
non-self-contradictory objects he pleases. In fact, it is just the
opposite as we have said, the only objects of geometry he cites
are those which closely resemble physical magnitudes. Could
this indicate that he never thought of allowing the mathematician freedom to construct and treat objects not resembling
quantified physical things? 23 On the other hand, it might be
suggested that Aristotle would never have intended such a
limitation of mathematics since numbers by their very nature
as more abstract than magnitudes are clearly not able to be
closely bound to physical quantities.
Ibid., 76b 8-7.
Ibid., 76b 8-10.
I I This is pointed out by Heath, ... Greek Mathe11ULtics, I, 887 and 877; Greenwood, " . . . Mathematical Constructibility," 89-98; H. G. Apostle, Aristotle's
Philosophy of Mathematics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 4~.
Euclid, for example, always constructed a particular mathematical entity before
making use of it in a demonstration; for example, only after he had constructed
a square did he go on to study it; only after he had constructed a perpendicular
to a straight line did he use lines at right angles to one another. Though Aristotle
does not explicitly say what he means by the demonstration of the existence of
a mathematical, it seems most reasonable to conclude that the Stagirite has in
mind the common Greek practice of construction.
sa Greenwood, " ... Mathematical Constructibility," 98-94 and "The Characters
of the Aristotelian Logic," Thomist, IV (194~), 244, seems to hold this position.
10

11
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In reply to this last point we must bring out some interesting
features concerning the way the Greek mathematicians of
Aristotle's time tended to look upon their science. In the first
place, it should be pointed out that among the Greeks arithmetic was closely tied to geometry and to actual physical
magnitudes. In general number theory was treated by them
in the framework of geometry.24 From the time of the Pythagoreans on, numbers were often represented geometrically.25
Euclid, for example, (about a generation after Aristotle) represents numbers by straight lines, planes, squares, cubes, etc. 26
This is especially true of irrational numbers, e. g., the square
root of two which could not be assigned a definite numerical
value but could be represented by magnitudes.21 Furthermore,
the Greeks had no notion of imaginary numbers or of negative
numbers, numbers which could hardly be said to correspond
to numerical aspects of physical things. Instead, the only numbers they used were the ordinary whole numbers and ratios,
1, 2, 3, i, 1, etc. Interestingly enough, it is not until Diophantes
(late third century A. D.) that we find any mathematical equations used which involve numbers raised to any power above
three, the cube. 28 Apparently, because there is no physical

I' Heath says, "With rare exceptions ... the theory of numbers was only treated
in connexion with geometry, and for that reason only the geometrical form of
proof was used, whether the figures took the form of dots marking out squares,
triangles, gnomons, etc. (as with the early Pythagoreans), or of straight lines (as
in Euclid Vll-IX) . . . ." (... Greek Mathematics, I, 16) Heath also points out
that even problems which we would call algebraic were only solved geometrically
by the Greeks. (Mathematics in Aristotle, p. 223, also . . . Greek M athematic8,
I, 379 fI. See also his explanation of "geometrical algebra," pp. 150-154.)
See also M. R. Cohen and I. E. Drabkin, A Source Book in Greek Science (Cambridge, 1958), p. 1 and p. 14, n. I.
15 Heath, ... Greek Mathematics, I, 76 fI.
18 Heath, ibid., I, 16, 98 and 879 fI.; Mathematics in Aristotle, p. 222.
' 2' The square root of two would be represented simply by drawing a square of
sides one and one whose diagonal would then be the square root of two. Many
authorities feel that it was the discovery of the irrational that turned the Greeks
in the direction of geometry and accounted for the" geometrizing" of number.
See, for example, Marshall Clagett, Greek Science in Antiquity (New York:
Abelard-Schuman, Inc., 1955), p. 57 and Cohen and Drabkin, ope cit.
18 Cohen and Drabkin, A Source Book . . . , p. 25.
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magnitude which has more than three dimensions, the Greeks
felt any higher power would be meaningless. The very terms
they used in arithmetic, some of which are still in use today,
probably show more than anything else the geometrical framework in which this study was carried on. Our terms like square
(a number is squared when it is multiplied by itself once)
and cube (a number is cubed when it is multiplied by itself
once and this in tum multiplied by the given number) clearly
indica te their geometrical origin. (Plato even refers to square
and cube numbers as planes and solids respectively.) 29 Indeed,
numbers were referred to by the Greek mathematicians as
cubes, squares, as oblong, triangular, polygonal, diagonal, as
sides, as rectilinear, scalene, spherical, circular-all fundamentally geometrical terms.so A certain kind of proportion between
numbers was called a geometrical proportion. s1 Various quadratic equations were solved geometrically using the construction
of figures. 32 Clearly, as we said, Greek arithmetic was closely
tied to geometry and then to physical magnitudes.
Since Aristotle, too, uses some of these geometrical tenus in
reference to numbers, ss this could indicate that he shares the
views of his countrymen that arithmetic is closely related to
geometry and thus that numbers somehow relate to physical
magnitudes. Thus, the arithmetician also may be considered
by the Stagirite to be restricted to constructing and hence
treating objects in some way corresponding to physical things.s4
The reference to Plato is in Heath, ... Greek Mathematics, I, 89.
All these expressions can be found between pages 76 and 117 in Heath,
... Greek }'lathematics, I.
81 Heath, ibid., I, 85.
8SI Heath, }'Iathematics in Aristotle, p. i28; . . . Greek Mathematics, I, 879 fIe
B. L. van der Waerden, Science Awakening (New York: Science Editions, 1964),
pp. 118-li6.
88 Physics, ITI, 4, 203a 18-15; Posterior Analytics, I, Ii, 78a 4; Nicomachean
Ethics, V, 8, lI8Ib 12-15. A particularly significant text is in the Metaphysics,
V, 14, IOiOb 8-6, where he refers to number in one or more dimensions, " ... numbers which are composite and not of one dimension only, viz. those of which the
plane and the solid are copies," [italics mine] and of other similar features of
numbers which he calls their " qualities."
., I do not mean to imply by this that Aristotle denies the specific distinction
Ie

80
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True, he in no place explicitly states that there is this restriction, on either geometry or arithmetic. Yet neither does he
give an indication that he feels that the mathematician, either
geometer or arithmetician, is free to construct or consider objects which do not in some way correspond to physical quantities. And most important, though there is nothing in his
philosophy of mathematics which positively precludes this freedom, compared to St. Thomas, there is precious little that could
form the epistemological basis for such freedom. It seems
reasonable to conclude, then, in the absence of statements to
the contrary, that Aristotle in this respect is a man of his time,
i. e., he considers the objects of mathematics to be idealized
representations of actual physical quantities and the mathematician to be restricted to such objects.
In concluding this section we should note the one text that
some claim gives some indication (though I believe it to be
extremely slight) that the Stagirite has some recognition of
the freedom of the mathematician. 35 Aristotle refers to the
necessity present in mathematical science as of a hypothetical
type. He states specifically that" It is impossible, for instance,
on a certain hypothesis that the triangle should have its angles
equal to two right angles ...." 36 On a different hypothesis, if a
straight line, for example, is defined in a different way, the value
of the interior angles will be two right angles. Does this imply
that either hypothesis is permissible? To generalize, does this
mean that the mathematician is free to construct and define
his figure any way he pleases? Note clearly that Aristotle never
between arithmetic and geometry, between number and magnitude. Just the
opposite. For instance, he criticizes the Pythagoreans for turning units into magnitudes. Nevertheless, even though he does assert the specific difference between the
objects of arithmetic and of geometry, there is no indication that this leads him
to disagree with his contemporaries who consider number in a geometrical context
as representative of magnitudes. Numbers certainly are not magnitudes; they
cannot be reduced to magnitudes; but still they can Tepresent (Aristotle calls them
copies in text of previous footnote) magnitudes.
15 Two who make this claim are Greenwood, ". . . ~IathematicaI Constructibility," 91-98, and Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle, p. 101.
I t De Caelo, I, Ii, i81 b 5-6.
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says this. Indeed, it seems impossible to say he is even implying
that either hypothesis is permissible. He is saying simply that
if a different hypothesis were chosen different conclusions would
follow. He never says that either one can be chosen. At best
the passage shows that he does recognize that different conclusions follow from different premises, but nowhere does he
really say that the premises are a matter of free choice. Indeed,
in the light of all we have already seen, viz., that the only geometrical objects he mentions are those resembling real quantities, and that numbers, too, at his time corresponded to physical things and their quantitative features, the indication that he
broke with the prevalent view of his time that mathematical
objects are limited to representation of physical quantities
seems very slight.
Let us now consider the philosophy of mathematics of
Thomas Aquinas with a view toward seeing if he has any more
explicit recognition of or epistemological basis for the freedom
of the mathematician.

Ill.

THE FREEDOM OF THE MATHEMATICIAN ACCORDING TO
AQUINAS

We should remind ourselves at the very beginning of the
areas of agreement of Thomas and Aristotle. For Thomas, like
his predecessor, mathematics is a science of quantity abstracted
from physical things, i. e., of real quantity not considered qua
real. Does this mean that he limits mathematics to quantities
closely resembling real things? We must reply that it is only
such quantities that he, like Aristotle, explicitly mentions. And
yet there are doctrines of his, doctrines not explicitly expressed
by the Stagirite, that seem to provide the basis for a greater
freedom on the part of the mathematician.
One such doctrine has to do with mathematical abstraction
itself and the objects which are its result. In one text, Thomas
describes these objects in a manner that indicates that he is
much more aware than Aristotle of their great independence
from (even though they are based upon) physical things.
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Aristotle, of course, clearly affirmed that mathematical quantities exist as such (i. e., with their peculiar mathematical characteristics) only in the mind of the mathematician. Aquinas
not only agrees with this but goes on to describe the objects
of mathematics in terms which he uses to describe beings of
reason. S7 He explains that, like the logical notions of genus,
species, etc., a mathematical is not simply a likeness of realities
existing outside the mind but instead is a consequence of man's
way of knowing some things outside the mind. Things of this
type, he says, are intentions which our intellect devises (adinvenit) because of its knowledge of extramental things. And he
adds, significantly, the proximate foundation for such intentions
is not "in things, but in the intellect, however the remote
foundation is the thing itself." 88 The expressions used here
by Aquinas to describe mathematical entities are the same as
those he uses in other places to describe beings of reason. S9
This is not to say that mathematical quantities are simply
created by man's intellect, for the intellect's act is of course
rooted in physical things. But this is to say that that which
immediately gives mathematicals their reality, that which is
their proximate foundation, is the activity of the mind itself.
(This is not, of course, the case with the beings studied in
either physics or metaphysics. They exist in their own right
apart from any act of a human intellect.)
I would like to suggest a contrast, or at least a difference in
emphasis, between Aquinas and Aristotle on this point. The
difference as I see it is that, compared to St. Thomas, Aristotle
tends to view the mathematician as more passive in his act
8'1' In I Sententiarum, d. i, q. 1, a. 3 c (parma edition, VI, p. i8).
(Incidentally,
this passage was written by Aquinas late in his life and inserted in his Commentary.
It should, therefore, give his mature position on the subject. On this point, see
A. Maurer, "A Neglected Thomistic Text on the Foundation of Mathematics,"
Medieval Studies, XXI (1959), 187.)
88 In I Sent., loco cit.
uln In IV Metaphyaica, L. 4, 574, for example, St. Thomas states that in contrast
to a natural being an em Tationia is strictly speaking an intention which reason
devises from the objects it considers, an intention which is not found in the nature
of thinp but is a consequence of the consideration of reason.
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of abstraction. To be sure, he "strips away" all the nonquantitative features of physical things-and this " stripping"
itself is an activity on his part. Yet when it comes to the actual
grasping of physical quantity the connotation is that the mathematician simply grasps what remains after all nonquantitative
features are removed. He simply "liberates," so to speak, the
real quantities of things from their sensible, mobile, material
existence, and proceeds to study them-real quantities but not
qua real. Now it is certainly true that Aquinas in many places,
especially his Commentaries, speaks of the mathematician's
abstraction in the same terms that his Greek predecessor uses.
(See, for example, texts cited in my first Section.) Nevertheless, in the passage discussed in the previous paragraph he
shows, I believe, more recognition of the activity of the intellect
in the actual production of mathematicals. The mathematician
does not just grasp real quantity stripped clean, he does not
simply study a likeness of real quantities, rather his object
is directly a product of his intellect's own activity-granted
that the activity has its remote foundation in the experience of
physical quantities.
Now in putting stress on the intellect as the proximate
foundation of mathematicals, in stressing therefore that these
entities are not mere likenesses of physical things, in describing
mathematicals as similar to beings of reason, it seems to me
that St. Thomas indicates much more clearly than did the
Stagirite that he recognizes that the mathematician's activity
of abstraction, and hence the object of his science, is not simply
a replication of real physical quantities. And there are other
doctrines of Aquinas which also have as their result the freeing
of the mathematician from strict dependence on physical quantities, doctrines which also bring more precision into Thomas's
statement that" the intellect" is the proximate foundation of
mathematicals. Of great significance is his teaching on the role
of imagination in mathematics. We will first discuss that role
in general and then its specific relevance to the question of
freedom in mathematics.
As is well known, the imagination for Aquinas plays a vital
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role in all knowledge, for he believes there can be no intellectual
knowledge without the phantasms it supplies.40 Of particular
import to our topic, however, is the special role it has in the
science of mathematics. Unlike Aristotle, Thomas leaves no
doubt that he holds that mathematicals, some at least, are
imaginable. His texts which assert this are numerous; I will
cite only one.
When sensible characteristics are removed there remains something
which is apprehended by the imagination .... Now mathematicals
are of this sort.41

Of course, in speaking of mathematicals being grasped by the
imagination, Thomas is referring to individual mathematicals,
not to mathematical essences which are grasped only by the intellect. We noted in the previous section that in one place
Aristotle spoke of individual mathematicals as grasped by " intuition," and distinguished this from mathematical essences
which are grasped by the mind. We noted also that he defined
this intuition no further. St. Thomas clearly refers this intuition
to imagination. 42 Individual mathematicals as such are not
attained by external senses, nor as individual are they present
in the intellect which is directly of the universal. Yet as individual they must be grasped by a sense power-the imagination.43
And yet, to say that individual mathematicals are imaginable
presents problems of its own. We noted in the previous section
that Aristotle never asserts that mathematicals are imaginable,
'0 Summa

Theologiae, I, q. 85, a. 1 c; In III De Anima, lect. 12, 781.
De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 2 c. Other texts which affirm that mathematicals are
imaginable are: De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 1 c and a. 2 c; De Veritate, q. 15, a. 2 c;
In VII Metaphysics, lect. 10, 1495; In III De Anima, Iect. 8, 715-6; Summa Theol.,
I, q. 7, a. S c; In III Physics, Iect. 7, 841; and In VI Nic. Eth., Iect. 7, 1210, 1214.
U In VII Metaphysics, lect. 10, 1494-5.
,. In the following passage Thomas clearly distinguishes the individual mathematicals which the imagination grasps from the essence of these mathematicals
which is grasped by the intellect.
" In the case of mathematics it can be shown that that which knows the essence,
i. e., the intellect, is distinct from what apprehends mathematical objects themselves,
i. e., the imagination." (In III De Anima, lect. 8, 715)
U
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and we suggested why. The imagination is a sense power, but
in his abstraction the mathematician leaves aside sensible qualities. How then can nonsensible mathematicals be grasped by
the imagination?
Because of this difficulty, some commentators have suggested
that the mathematicals which Thomas designates as imaginable
are not really the individual, quality-less, non-three-dimensional
objects of mathematics but only individual sensible objects
which come very close to being like them, e. g., a colored line
made up of very small dimensions but not actually colorless
or unidimensiona1.44 But this interpretation is contrary to too
many explicit statements by Aquinas. In no uncertain terms
he asserts that mathematical objects (in other words, the
qualityless, uni- and bidimensional entities) are in the imagination. For example, in the De Trinitate he asserts:
Mathematicals themselves come under the senses and are objects
of imagination, such as figures, lines, numbers and the like. 45

And there are countless places where he makes the same assertion. 46 In fact, mathematics is the most certain science, he says,
precisely because its objects are free from sensible matter and
yet imaginable.47 The problem, therefore, remains-how can
objects lacking sensible qualities be apprehended by a sense
power?
The solution must lie in showing that Aquinas believes
mathematicals to be sensible; in other words, in showing that
mathematical abstraction does not leave aside all the sensible
attributes of quantified physical things. Bear in mind that
quantity is a common sensible and that the common sensibles,
"Some who hold this view are Bernard Lonergan, "Note on geometrical possibility," Modem Schoolman, XXVII (1950), 1~7; E. Winance, " Note sur l'abstraction mathematique selon saint Thomas," Revue Philosophique de Louvain, LIII
(1955), 509; F. Collingwood, "Intelligible Matter in Contemporary Science,"
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XXXVIII (1964),
110.
1.5 De Trinit., q. 6, Ra. 1, ~ c.
,41 See the texts cited in footnote 41.
&'1 De Trinita.te~ q. 6, Ra. 1, ~ c.
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like the proper sensibles, are directly, not incidentally, sensed!8
Would it not be possible then for the imagination, which is able
to combine and divide imaginary forms and so end up with
images "even of things not perceived by the senses," 49 to
present an image of an originally apprehended physical thing
which image would be of only part of that thing, viz., of some
or all of its dimensions minus all of its proper sensible qualities?
This ability of the imagination would explain how Thomas can
say in reference to mathematicals that "even when sensible
characteristics are removed there remains something which is
apprehended by the imagination." 50 At least some mathematicals are sensible, and hence imaginable, because they are
the abstracted dimensional quantitative features of physical
things. 51 However, these imagined dimensions are mathematical
and not physical because by the power of imagination they have
been separated from the other sensible characteristics of physical things and may have even been reduced in dimension from
the physical three dimensions. What I am suggesting in effect
is that the imagination itself performs an abstraction on the
common sensibles; after all, it is not only the intellect which
abstracts according to Aquinas. 52
Sum1TUL Theol., I, q. 78, a. 8, ad i.
Ibid., a. 4 c.
riO De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 2 c.
n I say " at least some" (not all) mathematicals are sensible and hence imaginable. In In III De Anima, lect. 7, 758, Thomas, following Aristotle, apparently says
that points, which are dimensionless units having position, and units, which are
both dimensionless and positionless, precisely because they lack all dimension
cannot be grasped by any sense power but are only known mentally by negation.
It would follow that a number, which is a plurality of units, would not be imaginable, though some symbol representing it could be.
62 To abstract, St. Thomas says, is to consider one entity without another when
they are actually together in reality. (De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 8 c) Since each sense
power considers only what is proper to it and omits all other features of the
material thing, it can truly be said to abstract. Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 85, a. 8,
48

U

ad i.

One should not identify this abstraction of the imagination with the second degree
of abstraction, else he will end up with the difficulty Winance has, "Note sur
l'abstraction mathematique ... ," 507 ft. He clearly sees that merely eliminating
sensible qualities by the imagination does not result in an object of a different
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Incidentally, the fact that St. Thomas continually refers to
mathematicals as "nonsensible" does not contradict this conclusion. For in making such statements it seems clear that the
sensible features from which he considers the mathematician
to abstract are the accidents which follow after the accident of
quantity. "Accidents," he says,
befall substance in a definite order. Quantity comes first, then
quality, then passions and action. So quantity can be considered
in substance before the sensible qualities, in virtue of which matter
is called sensible, are understood in it.58

Clearly, the sense qualities he is talking about, those which
follow quantity, are only the proper sensibles. Since the mathematician does not abstract from the accidents of quantity
neither does he abstract from all sensible features, for quantity
is a common sensible. The dimensional figures studied by
mathematicians are not sensible inasmuch as they lack all
proper sensible qualities. Since it is "the sensible qualities
[which follow after quantity] in virtue of which matter is called
sensible," the mathematicals can be called nonsensible. They
are sensible, and hence imaginable, however, inasmuch as they
are abstracted dimensions, for dimensions are sensible.54
degree of intelligibility, or indeed in any intelligibility at all. Therefore, because
he has identified this abstraction of the imagination with the second degree of
abstraction, he denies it any validity as a Ineans of distinguishing the intelligible
objects of the sciences, 510. The degrees of abstraction for St. Thomas refer to
abstraction by the intellect from matter and motion, De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1 c.
ISS De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 8 c. See also Summa Theol., I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2.
U In the previous section in order to emphasize the fact that Aristotle never
refers to mathematicals as imaginable, we pointed to his use of the term intelligible,
rather than imaginable, to designate the special kind of matter found in mathematicals. Some have in fact suggested that since some mathematicals are imaginable
according to Aquinas he should have designated their matter as imaginable, rather
than retaining the Aristotelian designation of it as intelligible. (Winance," Note
sur l'abstraction mathematique . . . ," 508-510) However, such a change of
terminology is unnecessary, since in its most fundamental sense intelligible matter
designates for Aquinas substance as the substrate of only the accident of quantity.
But he notes, "the sense powers do not reach a comprehension of substance," (De
Trinitate, q. 5, a. 8 c) only the intellect does. Therefore, substance as the substrate
of quantity is properly termed "intelligible" matter. On this point, see my article,
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It follows from all of this that the imagination has an
especially important role in mathematics for Aquinas-a role
which, as we have said, is never mentioned by the Stagirite.
For, in addition to providing a stable image from which the
universal can be abstracted (this it does in all abstraction) /5
in mathematics it furnishes to the intellect perfectly appropriate individual mathematicals, which simply cannot be found
in nature, individuals from which the mathematical essence can
then be abstracted. The direct senses are able to supply an
appropriate object for the abstraction of physical essences; for
the intellect's abstraction the imagination simply provides a
stability in the changing objects grasped by sense. But the
direct senses themselves cannot provide a perfectly appropriate
object for abstraction of mathematical essences, for mathematical objects as such are not attainable by these senses. Rather
the imagination, through its abstraction discussed above, provides the proper object, the suitable individual mathematical
quantity, from which the mathematical essence can be abstracted.
By locating individual mathematicals in imagination, Thomas
has served to further liberate the objects the mathematician
studies from a close dependence on physical quantities. This
freedom is even more clearly brought to the fore by his assertion that the judgments of mathematics need only terminate
in the imagination. In a passage of the De Trinitate Aquinas
distinguishes between the origin and the termination of man's
knowledge. 56 "Now the beginning of all our knowledge," he
writes, "is in the senses "; however, the termination of knowledge is different in each of the three general kinds of science,
"Intelligible Matter and the Objects of Mathematics in Aquinas," The New
Scholasticism, LXIII (1969), 555-576, in which I distinguish the various meanings
of intelligible matter in Aquinas.
rsrs De Trinitate, q. 6, a.!l. On this point one might profitably consult the articles
by C. De Koninck, "Abstraction from Matter: Notes on St. Thomas's Prologue
to the Physics," Laval Theologique et Philosophique, XIII (1957), 140-1 and
w. Gerhard, "Natural Science and the Imagination," Thomist, XVI (1958),

I.

190-216.

De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 2 c.
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metaphysics, mathematics, and physics. "Judgment in mathematics," he asserts, "must terminate in the imagination." I
take this to mean that these judgments are true of, refer to,
imaginable entities. Thomas explains that, if a judgment is
true of realities which are only intelligible, it must stop, " terminate," in the intellect, as do metaphysical judgments; it could
not refer to imaginable or sensible realities and still be true of
purely intelligible entities qua intelligible. Thus, if a judgment
is true of imaginable entities which are not sensible, it must
stop, " terminate" in the imagination:
... because, when sensible characteristics are removed there remains
something which is apprehensible by the imagination, we must
judge about such things according to what the imagination reveals. 51

Finally, a judgment true of sensible realities, as in physics,
must stop in the senses. To repeat, since mathematicals according to St. Thomas are neither sensible things of nature, nor
purely intelligible realities, but (some at least) are imaginable,
a judgment about these objects cannot terminate in the senses,
nor simply in the intellect, but rather must do so in the imagination. In order to be true, judgments dealing with imaginable
objects must refer to what the imagination presents.
There is another way of looking at this notion that judgments
about mathematicals terminate in the imagination. According
to Aquinas, in the mental act of judging we grasp the existence
of an object, we grasp an entity as it is. This is distinguished
from the act of apprehension which only grasps the nature of a
thing and not its act of existence.58 Now since some individual
mathematicals exist as such by and in the imagination, it
stands to reason that the act of judgment must refer to,
terminate in, that which the imagination presents. In this
connection, we mentioned in the previous section that Aristotle
maintains that before a mathematical entity can be examined
it must be "demonstrated" that it exists. Though he never
said exactly how demonstrations of existence take place, judging from the common practice of his time he is referring to
If

Ibid.

18

Ibid., q. 0, a. 8 c.
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the construction of these objects. Thomas also speaks of demonstrations of existence in mathematics, and he designates them
as " operational" since they are by construction.59 Now since
this construction can only be of individual mathematicals (it
makes no sense to speak of "constructing" a mathematical
essence), it must take place in a sense power. But the only
sense power which grasps individual mathematicals as such is
the imagination. Hence, the locus of the construction of individual mathematicals must be this power. In other words, it
is in the imagination that mathematicals are shown to exist,
and this, of course, squares with the previously mentioned
point that judgments of their existence must terminate in and
only in the imagination.
Of course, as we have pointed out, if the mathematician's
judgments need only refer to imagined entities, this makes the
mathematician very free in his choice of objects and the operations he performs on them. While in physics and metaphysics
the intellect must conform itself to sensible being and intelligible
being respectively as they are in reality, in mathematics the
intellect need only conform to beings which exist in the mathematician's imagination.
Both this position and the earlier one which stressed the
intellect's activity as the proximate foundation of the objects
of mathematics clearly show that Aquinas considers the mathematician to be free from treating only objects which resemble
physical things. Yet how free? Is the mathematician free to
construct any mathematical he can and then go on to investigate its properties? Perhaps it would be of some help to look
more closely at the passage in which Aquinas speaks of mathematical demonstrations of existence-for this passage also sets
forth clearly his analysis of the general procedure of the mathematician in his science. (One will note that it is the same
general procedure Aristotle recognized.)
S9 In 1 Posterior Analytics, lect. ~, 5.
Thomas also refers to construction in
mathematics as the means of demonstrating the existence of mathematicals in
In 11 PosterioT Analytica, leet. 6, 4.
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There is supposed in these [mathematical] sciences those things
which are first in the genus of quantity such as unity and line and
surface and other such. These being presupposed, certain other
things are sought by demonstration, such as the quadrilateral
triangle, the square in geometry, and other such things. These
demonstrations are said to be, so to speak, operational, as is: On
a given straight line to construct an equilateral triangle. This
having been proved, certain further passions are proved, as that
its angles are equal or some other such thing....60

The mathematician supposes that those entities "which are
first in the genus quantity" exist (in imagination) and using
these entities goes on to construct, to demonstrate" operationally" certain figures or numbers composed of them. These constructions show that these composite objects do exist, and
he then proceeds to prove the properties of these figures or
numbers. As for the freedom of the mathematician in his
demonstrations of existence, it would seem that he is at liberty
to construct in imagination any mathematicals he can, and this
would apparently mean any quantities whose existence is not
self-contradictory. As far as the most basic quantities are
concerned, these seem to present no limitation either. Certainly,
as St. Thomas says, these elements-units, points, lines, and
surfaces-are ultimate in the genus quantity. Nothing more
basic could be abstracted and "supposed" by the mathematician-and indeed, since they are the most basic quantities,
how could the mathematician do anything else but" suppose"
them? 61 These certainly contain no built-in limitation as to
what the mathematician can study, for they are able to make
up any mathematical object in the imagination. They present
no limitation other than that the mathematician must deal
with quantity.
10

In I Posterior Analytics, lect. i, 5.

We might point out here that it is not up to the mathematician as such to
investigate the real foundation of those elements whose existence he assumes. He
simply takes them and goes to work from there. It would seem to be the province
of the philosopher of nature to show the basis in reality of these quantitative
elements and hence to show that they are not mere mental fictions.
et
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CONCLUSION

We have stressed the fact that, because individual mathematicals are located by Aquinas in the imagination and hence
mathematical constructions of existence and scientific judgments need refer to only such entities, the mathematician is
radically free in his choice of objects, and more specifically
he need not consider himself limited to dealing with mathematical quantities which closely correspond to and/or resemble
physical quantities. We have also suggested that this freedom
is indicated by Thomas's teaching that it is the intellect's
activity, not things, which is the proximate foundation of
mathematical objects and, following from this, his description
of mathematicals as similar to beings of reason (though one
might quarrel with Aquinas and propose that it would be more
accurate to say rather that the imagination's activity under
the direction of the intellect is the proximate foundation of
individual mathematicals).
Though these doctrines provide an epistemological foundation for the freedom of the mathematician from physical things
as far as his object is concerned, it remains the case that, like
Aristotle, Thomas also refers only to mathematical quantities
which in fact resemble physical quantities. The only geometrical
figures and solids he mentions are those of Euclidean geometry.
He too refers only to real numbers (not negative or imaginary) ,
and he refers to them in terms which may indicate that they
are still being viewed as related to physical magnitudes. For
example, he refers to numbers as surfaces, as solids, as two and
three-dimensional, as squares, cubes, etc. (though he clearly
recognizes that such words are used metaphorically) ,62 and
he never refers to a number raised to any power higher than
three, the cube.
It is true, of course, that by the thirteenth century mathematical objects were not considered to be simply idealized
representations of actual physical quantities, at least not to
"In V Metaphysics, leet. 14, 974; leet. 16, 989-991.
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the degree that they were in Aristotle's day. For one thing, the
algebra had been introduced by the Arabs and put into Latin
by some of the earliest translators.68 According to historians
of mathematics, the most prominent mathematics book in Latin
during Aquinas's time was probably the Liber Abaci by Leonardo Fibonacci (Leonardo of Pisa) , published in 1202, and it
was devoted to arithmetic and elementary algebra. Though it
contained no recognition of negative or imaginary numbers,64
it did have, in addition to the algebra, the use of the zero and
of fractions and operations upon them.65 Furthermore, during
Aquinas's day symbols were more and more being used to represent quantities; in fact, one who pioneered this was a friar,
Jordanus de Nemore, who in 1222 became general of the
Dominican Order. Certainly, the use of symbols, instead of
figures or numbers related to figures, to stand for quantities,
implies a view of mathematics which sees its objects removed
from direct correspondence to physical quantities. In fact, the
use of the zero alone indicates this, for it has no physical counterpart, and, indeed, for this reason it was looked upon by many
as suspect.
It is difficult to believe that Thomas Aquinas, who in other
areas was so keenly cognizant of the newly introduced knowledge of his time, would not at least have been aware of these
developments in the mathematics of his day. Indeed, one
author speculates that St. Thomas as a student used in his
Maurer, " A Neglected Thomistic Text ... ," 185.
(D. Stroik, A Concise History of
Mathematics [New York, 1948], p. 114)
815 For information on this book, its author, and the general state of mathematics
in the thirteenth century, consult F. Cajori, A History of Mathematics (New York:
The Macmillan Company. 1951), pp. 117-125; H. Eves, An Introduction to the
History of Mathematics (New York, 1961), pp. 209 fI. See also T. Greenwood,
~tudes sur La Connaisaance Mathematique (Ottawa: Ottawa University Press,
1942), pp. 66 fI.
ee Greenwood, Etudes sur . . . , p. 65. However, Vernon Bourke, in his more
recent work, Aquinas' Search for Wisdom (Milwaukee, 1965), says that the
quadrivium was no longer followed in the thirteenth century because masters
proficient in the mathematical sciences were scarce, p. 22. And he gives nothing
to support the view that Thomas was taught the "new mathematics."
ea

e, First used by Raffael Bombelli, 1550.
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studies the Liber Abaci, for it was a commonly used text in the
quadrivium. 66 Be that as it may, I know of no place in Aquinas's
writings where he explicitly refers either to the algebra or to
the zero or to the use of symbolism in mathematics. He, like
Aristotle, refers only to figures and numbers which correspond
to physical quantities.
Nevertheless, in spite of this, it seems clear to me that the
aforementioned epistemological doctrines of Aquinas go much
further than Aristotle's toward allowing great freedom, to the
mathematician. It may well be that Thomas himself was barely
aware of the consequence of his own position. But it still
remains that his teachings which emphasize that it is man's
intellectual activity not physical things which is the proximate
foundation of mathematical objects, and in particular his stress
on the role of the imagination as that in which individual
mathematicals are demonstrated to exist and in which mathematical judgments terminate, are at best only implied in Aristotle. And it is these doctrines which serve to liberate mathematics from any requirement of dealing with quantities which
match real quantities.
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